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This study attempts to determine the general information security awareness and culture of 
users within an academic environment.  Users in department of epidemiology in the School 
of Public Heath and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were asked to complete a 
survey with questions requesting knowledge and user statistics of general issues, information 
security technologies, threats, and policies  It was determined that this department exhibited 
low confidence of knowledge in information security issues and demonstrated a culture in 
which users failed to utilize and grasp technologies, tools, and policies not directly affecting 
the user.  The data provides general understanding of security awareness issues; however 
further detailed research is necessary to reveal specific failures in information security 
awareness.   
 
Headings: 
Information Systems - Security  
Information Security – Awareness 
Information Security - Culture 
Information Technology – Security 
Information Security - Academic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THINKING ABOUT SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
CULTURE AND AWARENESS IN AN ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT 
by 
Spencer W. Gee 
A Master’s paper submitted to the faculty 
of the School of Information and Library Science 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in 
Information Science. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
May 2007  
Approved by 
_______________________________________ 
Paul Solomon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Introduction: 
  
Statement of Problem  
     As the university becomes more and more dependent on information technologies, 
there is often the attitude by many users that the large technology presence itself yields a 
safe and secure environment for information sharing.  Whether users are under the 
assumption that security measures are in place because the university is rich in 
technology and should have the capabilities to provide the necessary coverage or that 
security measures are simply unnecessary, it appears that users are unaware of the 
security risks in which they place their information, themselves, and their colleagues on a 
daily basis.  In the field of desktop support, this lack of security awareness is 
demonstrated time and time again in the form of users sharing or discussing research data 
via insecure media, users failing to avoid common security pitfalls, and sometimes a 
blatant disregard for threat awareness.  In the field of public health, this lackadaisical 
attitude towards information security holds greater concern given recent federal 
regulations regarding the handling of personal and health information such as HIPAA.  It 
is imperative for researchers in schools such as the School of Public Health at UNC to 
maintain compliance with federal standards and work in secured environments not only 
to ensure that the data is not compromised in any way, but also to develop sound research 
findings that aid in the continuance of support from funding organizations.  
 
 
 2
Purpose of Study  
    This study considers security awareness on a broad scale to evaluate the current 
security culture in an academic environment and reveal areas for improvement of security 
awareness.  With emphasis on several main areas of interest (general awareness, 
technologies, threats, and policy), it is the goal of this study to understand where security 
awareness is lacking so that information security education and policy can be applied in a 
more efficient and effective manner.   
     In looking at general information security awareness, the study will focus on usage of 
information security technologies and whether user background and position within the 
department play a role.  A technology portion looks at security protocols and applications 
that are readily accessible to every user in the scope of this project.  The goal of focusing 
on security technologies is to see how these tools are viewed, being implemented, or 
where the design flaws may exist based on attitude and culture.  An emphasis on security 
threats helps to understand the current state of information security and the severity of 
issues at hand.  Finally, a look into existing information security policies and attitudes 
towards their effectiveness further define the overall information security culture of the 
department.  Of the existing regulations examined in this study are those described in 
HIPAA.  This particular policy was chosen because of its relatively current federal 
mandate to adhere to its regulations and the likelihood that HIPAA regulations affect the 
population in a direct manner.   
     User types are a focus in this study to understand how certain segments of the 
population address information security and their level of security awareness.  With this 
knowledge, we can see which user group(s), if any, demonstrate any security awareness 
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and to what degree they implement security technologies or procedures.  Ultimately, this 
focus serves to determine which user group poses the greatest concern and risk of 
security and has greater needs for education or policy to address its level of security 
awareness.  The user types were chosen because all users within the selected population 
can be assigned to one of these main categories and these categories generally represent 
people with particular roles related to information security within an academic 
department: 
 
• Faculty – includes all employees of EPA status (assistant, associate, research, 
adjunct and tenured faculty) 
• Staff – includes all staff working under any capacity for the department; 
categorized as administrative or research. 
• Students – includes all students currently enrolled in course or program within the 
department. 
   
Theoretical Perspective  
 This study lies mainly within the discipline of information systems management 
and the results of this study have applications in systems design and organizational 
development with regards to security policies.  The theoretical framework for this study 
is based on contextual analysis, as we hope to find and understand correlations between 
end-user behaviors, attitude towards security policy, and applications of security tools to 
assess the overall state of security culture. 
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Research Question and Hypothesis 
     What is the level of security awareness within an academic department in a major 
public university?  In looking at various user groups, it is believed that staff, particularly 
the research positions, will have the greater awareness for information security issues 
because of their likelihood to have more involvement with information technologies.  The 
administrative staff will have a lower level of awareness based on their level of usage, 
and faculty and student positions will have the lowest level of awareness based on their 
area of focus.  
 
 
 
 
Literature:  
User behavior and needs: 
     Common among much of the literature review is the realization that user input and a 
user focus is imperative in addressing any information security management strategies or 
issues.  Studies have shown that with respect to password management, users will find 
ways to circumvent password requirements if they infringe on the user’s ability to 
implement them with ease or if they exceed their perception of usability.  While 
password management is relatively low in complexity value, it poses one of the larger 
threats to information security.  Implementing a solution for this is not simply changing 
the requirements; however, but requires understanding of the attitude users have towards 
password management and developing a strategy that finds a balance between usability, 
manageability, and protection.  A study by D. Stetson revealed user requirements for the 
 5
same key components of a security management system. With this in mind, one of this 
study’s goals is to determine where the current attitude towards security lies.  
     Another reason for the user focus, and as demonstrated in the literature (Smith, K.), is 
that users are the single point of attack for a variety of security risks.  Password theft is 
just one of several risks that rely on user execution.  Email viruses, worms and trojans 
serve as possibly the most debilitating information security risks because their impact 
goes beyond a single user.  These threats spread rampantly on a global scale when 
successfully executed which makes user awareness of such security threats even more 
vital.  In addition to these threats, social engineering ploys via online communications 
prey on the gullibility of human nature on a massive scale.  Unfortunately, users are often 
oblivious to concepts reaching beyond their immediate scope of work and function with 
regards to information security. 
     Other literature examines specific areas of network technology and how the 
technology has impacted users.  A study by J. Budd and L. Connaway demonstrated that 
access to network data storage and the use of email technologies had affected the 
information seeking behavior and collaboration methods of university faculty.  While this 
study was conducted 10 years ago, it provides early evidence of the growing dependency 
on network communications and data access within an academic environment; this study 
seeks to understand the security issues surrounding this dependency.  Another study 
(Ryan, S.D. and Bordoloi, B.) also identified a shift in information systems from the use 
of mainframes to more client/server based system architectures.  This movement from a 
centralized system to one that is more user-centric expands the security focus from one 
location to multiple locations in the form of user workstations.  With less centralized 
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control, security strategies must adapt to the new dispersed architecture, and with it 
grows security risks that must be maintained to some degree at the user level.  More 
recent studies (Liebscher, P et al) find that file transfers and email have the highest 
ratings in usage.  With each move of data over networks there are risks of insecure 
transactions or inadvertent use of a compromised network.  Identity and data theft cases 
are increasing as we see users becoming more and more dependent on electronic 
resources for monetary and data transactions. 
    In understanding the needs of users, we should also consider the security behaviors of 
users as well.  One study (Stanton, J.M. et al) has shown that when implementing a 
taxonomy scheme of security behaviors, users find it difficult to differentiate behaviors 
classified as naïve mistakes to those that are intentionally malicious and purposefully 
detrimental.  This lack in distinction demonstrates that current security awareness is not 
fully-established and is lacking in structure from the user perspective.  These findings 
reinforce the notion that security awareness is a murky entity and this research will hope 
to better define the awareness level for means of developing and security strategy. 
      
Culture/Awareness: 
    With respect to culture and awareness, a study by L. Strickland and L. Hunt proceeded 
to investigate the attitudes of non-technical and technical user groups towards the use of 
new security devices.  The results showed that, while there was some enthusiasm in 
implementing the new security device, there were concerns regarding information 
privacy and susceptibility to abuse.  The subjects of the study felt federal regulation 
would be in order and implementation of a structure policy for use required before they 
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felt the technology was a viable option for security.  From these results we gathered that 
the attitude towards new technology is one of caution and apprehension.  This is not 
necessarily an undesirable in considering security technologies, because new devices 
often raise reasonable concerns regarding privacy and abuse.  It is important for this 
research to understand the attitudes which underlay this hesitation and possibly determine 
if it is this hesitant mind-set that holds people back from implementing other security 
technologies.   
     Other findings in the literature reveal that the security awareness of users seldom goes 
beyond the focus of the individual.  Stetson suggested that security management policies 
take into consideration that users are often ignorant of the fact that it is not always the 
user that directly transfers the data or engages in the technology that pose the biggest 
security threats.  Other issues posed in the study alluded to current security management 
policies lacking in enough structure for users understand the scope required to support a 
robust security culture.  In developing a climate to reflect this philosophy, the challenge 
becomes not just educating a single user, but developing a security culture in which all 
users are aware of the impact that they have on the overall system.   
     With awareness there is also the idea of information sensitivity, which helps to 
describe the security need of a management system.  The issue with information 
sensitivity, however, is that there are few objective qualifiers to assess sensitivity for the 
vast amount of data types and scenarios of data management.  One research study 
(Thompson, E. and Kaarst-Brown, M.) attempted to offer some strategies based on user 
scenarios and developed a categorical relevance scheme and “frame knowledge”, a 
contextual basis for the data, to help define sensitivity of data.  Ultimately, sensitivity 
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assignments fall upon a user, which may affect the user’s perception of security needs 
and their overall security awareness. 
 
Security design/strategy: 
     A portion of the literature reviewed offered suggestions for security strategies and 
security management systems design. One such study (Eloff, J. & Eloff, M.) suggested an 
alternative approach to viewing security management systems; one that divides the 
information security management system into two functional components that address the 
two main divisions in security strategy: process and products.  This proposed paradigm 
coincides with the security awareness/culture and security tools areas of information 
security, which is observed in this study.  The process component focuses on the 
managerial processes and policy implementation of a security system and addresses 
issues such as accountability and stability of security practices; two factors that are 
expected to greatly affect a user’s attitude towards information security.  The product 
component focuses on specific tools, their reliability, accountability, and usability in 
terms of successfully implementing a security system.  While specific tools are not 
discussed in the Eloff study, the concept that product attributes play a large role in 
security management indicates that the issue of tools needs to receive attention in this 
study. 
     Other literature expanded on the product focus and focused on understanding the 
specific attributes of security products that make them ideal or adaptable according to 
user surveys.  In the study conducted by C. Chiu, users concluded that web-based 
systems should exhibit a high level of accessibility, safety constructs, and that the system 
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maintained a perception that it was easy to use and purposeful.  These insights, if 
applicable to specific information security systems, can help in better defining the 
attitudes of users towards current security systems and the available security tools. 
     One study (Karabacak, B and Sogukpinar, I.) offered another security strategy; 
however, their approach focused on security risk assessment and analysis to determine 
security needs.  All of these research findings provide insights into approaches for 
determining where security needs lie within the population of this study and can be used 
in conjunction with user perception data to determine possible differences in user 
awareness and security needs. 
 
Security management: 
     Security management strategies play a key role in understanding how the current 
security climate came to be and what factors have aided in the shaping of user attitude 
towards security awareness.  The study conducted by M. Karyda et al. suggests security 
policies in fact do have broad affects on overall security culture and should be developed 
with this “global” perspective.  Keeping in line with these findings, the proposed study 
also considers various aspects of security awareness, from specific tools and threats to 
management strategies, and hopes to reaffirm the necessity for this contextual perspective 
on information security.      
     Other aspects of security management include identifying data breadth and how it 
factors into security awareness.   Particularly in university settings, representatives of a 
single academic department may engage in numerous research projects that overall 
combine to form a range of data and associated security issues.  Management of this data, 
 10
particularly with a focus on security, becomes an every present issue.  C. Koh, in his 
study on data management in executive information systems, demonstrated trends in 
increasing data breadth; which, in turn, raise concerns for security management systems 
to continually evolve in order to maintain the integrity of the data.  The analysis of this 
issue on a departmental scale and the accompanying security awareness gained from this 
effort will help to define the current state of the security culture in the department, which 
is the focus of this study. 
     Based on the literature reviewed, there is a sound basis for this research study, 
particularly with implications in security strategy development and security management.  
There also were few resources specifically addressing end-user security behavior and also 
the overall attitude and security awareness in how it relates to user perceptions of 
security.  This research hopes to fill some of this void with empirical data and analysis 
that will be applicable for the development of security management strategies, education 
of security awareness, and the development of a security culture.    
 
 
 
 
Method:  
  
Research Approach:  
       
     On-line surveys served as the primary research approach for data collection.  Each 
participant was asked to complete a survey consisting of 33 questions emphasizing 
specific topics of information security with the overall goal of gathering data regarding 
these main areas of concern:  
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• User awareness of information security issues on an individual and departmental 
level  
• Knowledge and understanding of information security technologies and usage 
experience with these technologies 
• Knowledge and understanding of information security threats, including personal 
experiences with these threats 
• Awareness of existing information security policies and general attitude towards 
information security policy.   
      
Population, Participants and Participant Recruitment 
    Since the purpose of this study is to examine the security awareness and culture of an 
academic environment, specifically one with a public health interest, the case selected 
was that of the Epidemiology department within the School of Public Health at UNC-CH.  
This department maintains a large employee base and has a desired spectrum of users 
who are ideal for this study based on categorical assignment and network usage and 
availability.  There are 275 total participants available in this population.  Each employee 
is assigned to one of the three categories: faculty, staff, and student; and total numbers of 
participants for each category are 61, 58, and 156 respectively.  These categories are the 
three main user groups within the department, and every user in the population can be 
represented by one of these three groups.  While the pool of participants will include all 
full-time employed staff, faculty, and enrolled students, the data from a minimum of 25 
participants from each user category will be employed for the analysis.  Anonymous 
participation was requested via email. A direct URL link to the survey was provided to 
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the intended population of this study in the email along with a letter of recruitment for 
participation in this study.  Recruitment for participation clearly stated the purpose of the 
survey, condition of anonymity and intended use of the resultant data.  With the 
minimum data requirement met for all three categories following the first participation 
request, no additional survey participation requests were made to the selected population.       
     
Variables, Measurement Techniques, Data Collection Instruments & Materials  
     The survey consists of five main sections: background, technologies, threats and 
policy.  The data collected by the online survey does not include personal-identifying 
information; however some background information on position classification, position 
title, and general technology usage data, such as years of experience and technology 
usage frequencies, were requested to characterize the user.  This data provides separation 
among specific user groups and assists with categorically defining trends in information 
security within the population.   
    The technologies section of the survey includes experience with various information 
technologies (client/server connectivity using SecureFTP, terminal sessions using SSH 
protocols, data encryption software, and spyware/malware detection and removal 
applications).  Both grasp of knowledge/understanding and usage frequencies of each 
technology were requested of the participant. 
     The threat section includes questions regarding specific known threats and social 
engineering ploys.  Gathering data on user familiarity and understanding, as well as 
specific personal experience, with these threats and ploys are the goals of this section.    
The final section proceeds with various questions regarding the user’s attitude towards 
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information security policies, federal regulations including HIPAA, and general 
effectiveness and attitude towards information security measures in place; known and 
unknown.   
     The on-line survey was created within and deployed from the Qualtrix.com survey 
system available through the Odum Institue of Research for Social Science at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Of the 33 questions included in the survey, 
29 were closed-ended and 4 were open-ended.  The complete survey is available in 
Appendix II.   
    
Study Procedures  
    A contact list for all employees within the department was acquired from the human 
resource facilitator.  This list was created from several mailing lists managed through the 
UNC-CH List Server.    An email requesting user participation, including a link to the on-
line survey, was sent to the mailing lists provided.  The survey remained active, allowing 
users to participate, for two weeks immediately following the recruitment mailing.  The 
raw data and reports were downloaded from the Qualtrix.com system in Microsoft Excel 
and Word formats for analysis.  All possible user-identifying information gathered with 
the survey data was removed during data exporting to retain anonymity of survey data. 
 
Results and Discussion: 
Population statistics: 
     At the end of the two-week data collection period, a total of 109 users participated in 
the on-line survey.  There was a relatively even distribution of faculty and staff, 24.8% to 
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26.6% respectively, and students comprised the largest portion of participants at 48.6%. .  
While there is an increase in population percentage from faculty to staff to students, this 
survey ratio of participant groups does not reflect their actual percentage of total 
department population.  Both 
faculty and staff positions had an 
average participation rate of 
47.1%, and students participated at 
a much lower 34%.  There were no 
advantages for any particular user 
group during recruitment; therefore the actual participation percentages are likely 
indicative of user-willingness, accessibility, and/or convenience factors.  The notion that 
increased participation is the result of a greater sense of value and importance for the 
purpose of this survey is explored in findings later discussed in this section. 
     Recorded position titles demonstrated a wide diversity of participants from various 
levels of student degree programs, administrative and research staff, and professorships.  
It was important for the survey data to reflect all possible user types, and subsequently 
their usage patterns, knowledge and attitudes, within the department to formulate and 
assess the complete picture of overall information security culture and awareness.  The 
makeup of the user population demonstrates this achievement.   
     In addition to the main user categories, two characteristics, both years of experience 
and usage frequency with information technologies, were incorporated into the survey to 
further define the population and help understand how factors other than position in the 
department play in information security awareness.  The data shows that there is some 
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relationship between 
position category and years 
of experience with 
technology.  While the 
faculty position had the 
greatest range in years, 2 to 
42, compared to 4 to 30 for 
staff and 0 to 18 for students, there was little difference in the overall averages with 15.8, 
15.7, 11.4 for faculty, staff, and students respectively.  The mode for both staff and 
students was identical at 10 while more faculty claimed 13 and 15 years of experience 
with information technologies than any other amount of experience.  While it is expected 
that faculty may hold a significant age difference over students, accounting for the higher 
average in years of experience, the results show a fairly even distribution of technology 
experience among all three position categories.   
    With years of experience in information technologies compared against the entire 
population, the data was divided into 3 intervals, zero to 10 years, 11 to 20 years, and 21 
years or more occupying 36.7%, 55.1%, and 8.2% of the total population respectively.  
The span of intervals serves as a general period of time in which computer technology 
becomes obsolete.  These intervals assess whether experience of older technologies 
provides some insight and/or advantage in information security awareness.   
    While the data regarding years of experience between the position categories revealed 
minimal differentiation, usage frequency and information sharing data defined usage 
patterns for each position category.  Insight into these usage patterns will help identify 
 16
areas of weakness or concern for addressing information security issues. .  Results show 
that most (66.7%) faculty use information technology for 40 or more hours per week.  
More staff claimed 30 to 40 hours of usage more than any other usage span.  47.1% of 
students claimed 40 or more hours as the typical weekly usage amount; and 96.2% of all 
student participants stated 
they work with various 
information technologies 
at least 20 hours per 
week.  With a high 
concentration of “40+ hrs 
“users for both faculty 
and student categories and with more staff aligned with the 30 to 40 hour usage span, 
these trends could suggest a number of possibilities.  They could imply that the type of 
work that both faculty and student positions dictate have greater information technology 
needs, compared to the work of staff members; therefore requiring more hours of 
technology usage.  This trend could also suggest that both faculty and students, as a result 
of work dictated by their roles in the department, are required to log more hours within a 
given week, compared to staff positions.  Working beyond the typical 40 hour work-week 
for both students and faculty could account for the increased usage, whereas staff may 
only be required, or choose, to work within the confined standard business hours.  With 
the current data available, it is not possible to confirm either reasoning; further research 
on usage patterns and work requirements are needed. 
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     In addition to usage frequency, participants were asked whether they shared data with 
colleagues, and if so, how often.  Information security concerns are applicable to stand-
alone users, but these 
concerns are magnified 
when electronically sharing 
data and engaging in higher 
data trafficking behavior.  
Survey data showed that 
only 7 out of 109 
participants, 6.4%, do not 
share data with colleagues.  Of the remaining 93.6% of participants who do share data, 
the majority of faculty and staff participants shared data within the daily and weekly 
ranges; 69.2% and 78.6% respectively.  Students showed a slightly lower frequency with 
most users sharing data weekly and 68.8% of students shared data electronically either 
weekly or monthly.          
 
General Awareness: 
     This block of questioning was designed to understand departmental users’ grasp of 
basic information security issues as it pertains to those that their department is required to 
address (4a), measures provided by the department (4b), how these security issues apply 
to their work in the department, (4c), knowledge of information security tools availability 
(4d), and whether information security needs are met in the work environment (4e). 
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     Using a 7-point scale to rate the user’s level of knowledge on each topic, the data 
shows only slight differentiation between faculty, staff and students in their knowledge of 
these topics.  Based on response averages, the faculty appear to be most knowledgeable 
on information security issues that the department is required to address and security 
measures provided by the department.  On average scores, research staff in particular 
seemed to grasp information security issues and needs as it pertains to their own work 
and work environment the most.   Generally, student scores were among the lowest for all 
questions in this block.   
    In all likelihood, these results are the by-product of longevity within the department.  
While there is no explicit data to reinforce this thinking, faculty and staff generally have 
longer tenures within the department than the graduate students enrolled for the typical 2 
year masters program or the 4 year doctoral program.  Increased longevity in the 
department yields a greater duration of exposure to departmental measures and resources 
and would allow these users more opportunity to become more knowledgeable and 
understanding of the issues and any measures in place.   
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     Users across the board seemed most knowledgeable that their information security 
needs are being met in the work environment and how information security applies to 
their personal work in the department.  The later finding is not surprising since users are 
generally most familiar with their personal work, and one would expect the user to have 
the best grasp of topics in relation to their work.  The issue of information security needs 
being met; however, is intriguing in that users, on average across the entire population, 
were least knowledgeable on information security measures provided by the department.  
This could be a sign of users’ “blind-faith” mentality with issues that do not notably 
affect their daily work or with issues so poorly understood that it is assumed they lack 
importance.  In both scenarios, the user may see this as a responsibility of the 
department’s information technology support staff and trust and approval are given 
blindly.          
     In looking at how years of experience affected general information security 
awareness, each average score increased, for the most part, with each span increased.  
While the mode values for “0 to 10 yrs” and “11 to 20 years” were nearly identical, 
average values increased by one tenth of a point for all questions, except the one 
regarding information security as it applies to the users work in the department.  
 
 It is peculiar that more experienced users were less knowledgeable on information 
security issues applicable to their own work.  One speculation is that the type of work 
performed by the more experienced users does not raise concerns for information security 
issues (or at least based on the user’s assessment); however the data gathered cannot 
confirm this reasoning.  Users in the “21 or more” years of experience category scored 
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the highest mode and average values for all general awareness topics, but the data are 
somewhat misleading in that this demographic makes up only 8.3% of the total 
participant population. 
 
     While only a small subset of the population, users in this group showed significant 
increases in knowledge of these topics (minimum differential +0.5, maximum differential 
+1.3 in average scores; mode scores at least 2 points above “11 to 20” group).  Overall, 
the findings of this comparison group were not outside of expected results.  In all 
likelihood, more experience with information technologies could lead to more 
opportunities in working with resources that have specific or greater information security 
needs.  Experience in these opportunities should increase general awareness of 
information security issues. 
     Just as with position category vs. general awareness, it appears as though usage 
frequency does not have a significant impact on general awareness of information 
security topics.   
There is, however, separation between larger usage groups. The highest average scores 
fall within the “30 to 40 hours” range.  Scores of users claiming “40 or more hours” of 
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usage per week drop slightly; however are still comparatively higher than users with less 
than 30 hours of use per week. 
 
     There is little difference in the scores for users between 10 and 30 hours of usage, and 
while data for the “0 to 10 hour” range was collected, only one user fell within that 
category and posted the lowest scores for any usage group.  On average, users with over 
30 hours of usage have a slightly greater knowledge of general information security 
awareness.  This was expected, just as the results for experience vs. general awareness, 
for similar reasons.  One could expect that more daily exposure to information 
technologies would increase likelihood of exposure to resources and needs that require 
more working knowledge or familiarity with information security issues.  This thinking, 
however, does not account for the drop in average and mode scores from the “40+” group 
to the “30 to 40” group.  It is possible that the work required for positions within the “30 
to 40” group on average requires more familiarity with information security issues; while 
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it is also possible that the differential of scores within the “40+” group have caused a 
skew in averaged data.  47.7% of the survey population fall within the “40+” hours per 
week usage group.    
     Overall results for the general awareness questions demonstrate mostly expected 
trends in position category, years of experience, and usage frequencies in relation to 
general information security issues.  There did not appear to be a notable differentiation 
between position categories, and both experience and usage frequencies showed expected 
correlations of increased experience and usage yielding increased knowledge on general 
information security topics.  In looking at the entire population data for this general 
awareness section, it is clear that most average values and mode values fall below the 
mid-point for knowledge.  With most scores falling within the 2 to 3 point range, there is 
overwhelming evidence to support that the population has a low general awareness level 
of information security issues.  While users’ lack the knowledge and general awareness, 
scores for knowledge on having information security needs met in their work 
environment were typically the highest of all topics.  This shows the population has 
confidence that their needs are met; however the remaining data gives little reason as to 
why this attitude is present.   
 
 
Technology: 
     With most users of this study participating in electronic data sharing, most frequently 
on a daily or weekly basis, and with usage levels primarily above 30 hours a week, it is 
reasonable to expect that many of the users interact with information security tools, 
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particularly those chosen for this study which were selected for their basic complexity 
and accessibility.   
     The data, however, 
showed this is not the 
case with 3 of the 4 tools 
queried.  There is little 
question that a low 
percentage of participants 
are even remotely 
knowledgeable of SFTP, SSH , and data encryption tools, with 70%, 76.6%, and 64.8% 
of users registering scores of only 1 or 2 (1 being the lowest possible level of knowledge) 
for SFTP, SSH, and data encryption respectively.  Spyware/malware scanning software 
appears to be the most known tool in this study.  Only 40.2% of participants registered 
scores of either a 1 or 2.  With all technologies, more users registered a score of 1 than 
any other score.  While spyware/malware scanning software ranks highest among user 
knowledge, SSH tools rank the lowest.  Only 13.1% of the entire population felt they 
were above average (the midpoint of the scale, 4, serving as average knowledge) in 
knowledge of SSH tools.  
     Reinforcing this finding that the user population has little knowledge and awareness of 
these information security tools is the usage frequency data of these tools.    A striking 
statistic is that 63.3%, 76.1%, and 70% of users have never used SFTP, SSH, and data 
encryption tools, respectively—at least that they are aware of.  Only 15.6%, 15.6%, and 
11% of participants claim to use SFTP, SSH, and data encryption tools on a daily or 
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weekly basis, respectively.  In a stark contrast, only 29.4% of the total participants have 
never used spyware/malware scanning software and 38.5% of users claim to use this tool 
on a daily or weekly 
basis. 
     Analysis of this total 
population data provides 
some insight into the 
tools, and can support 
numerous conclusions 
about general awareness, functionality and usability.  Both SFTP and SSH tools ranked 
the lowest in both usage frequency and user knowledge.  These two tools are connection-
based technologies, and their mode of operation may be the reason for low usage and 
knowledge responses.  Other tools, less-globally standardized, may be in use that serve 
the function SFTP and SSH tools provide.  It’s also possible that the work specific to a 
user does not require such connection utilities; therefore exposure to these tools and 
knowledge of them may be held at a minimum.  Both data encryption and 
spyware/malware scanning tools are generally in the form of stand-alone applications that 
are installed and run on local computers.  The separation between data encryption and 
spyware/malware tools in terms of knowledge and usage frequency is most likely a by-
product of today’s information technology culture than issues surrounding accessibility 
and function.  With our ever-increasing concerns over identity and data theft, coupled 
with fear over data mining through web interfaces, the spyware movement receives a 
significant portion of publicity among information security threats.  The knowledge 
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distribution for spyware/malware tools in this study reinforce this idea that the average 
user knowledgeable and aware of spyware/malware issues and tools available. 
     Based on position category data with respect to knowledge of each technology, faculty 
participants scored the highest in all security tools.  Staff average scores were slightly 
higher than students in SFTP and data encryption tools, and scored lower in 
spyware/malware scanning tools compared to student participants, with differentials of 
+0.5, +1.3 and -1.1 respectively. 
  
     The most glaring statistic in these results is the difference in average scores between 
research and administrative staff.  Research staff recorded scores for all technologies at 
an average of 1.3 points higher than administrative staff.  Since there is no advantage in 
accessibility or resources for either staff group, it is likely the nature of their work and 
function in the department that yields a greater understanding of these technologies.  
Research staff may need to take advantage of connectivity tools such as SSH and SFTP 
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for network data stores, where administrative staff may work more with local data stores 
or files accessible in other mediums that do no require these tools.  Many of the research 
staff in the department work with secured data or data that require higher security and 
protection levels as mandated by their funding agencies.  This would account for the +1.9 
differential in knowledge of data encryption vs. administrative staff; however, more 
research into the nature of work and work requirements would be needed to confirm this 
explanation.   
     The effect of years of experience on technology knowledge shows almost consistent 
increase in average scores of knowledge with increase in experience.  The exception to 
this is with spyware/malware scanning technologies.  There is an increase in average 
knowledge score from the “0 to 10” group to “11 to 20”, however, there is a significant 
drop (-1.4 points) as the experience increases into the “21 or more” group with respect to 
spyware/malware scanning tools.  With only 9 participants in the “21 or more” group, the 
results are not necessarily absolute; however it’s difficult to ignore the progression.  
Though SFTP and SSH are relatively new technologies, connection protocols and 
encryption are not necessarily new tools to the IT world, which may explain the increased 
knowledge with more experience.  Spyware/malware tools, however, are a relatively new 
concept and technology, therefore it would make sense that experience does not have the 
linear affect in knowledge of this technology.  The small increase of average scores from 
the “0 to 10” group to the “11 to 20” group is counter-balanced by a higher mode value 
(by 1 point) of the “0 to 10” group.   
     General technology usage frequency in relation to knowledge of information security 
technologies show some correlation based on results.  While usage frequency is broken 
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into 10-hour increments, the effect of usage frequency on security tools knowledge seems 
to define itself at a larger 20-hour increment.  Data from the “0 to 10” hours per week 
range included only one survey participant, who consequently recorded the lowest score 
possible for all tools, so while this information does follow in line with the trends 
demonstrated with the more frequent usage groups, the data is not necessarily indicative 
of this usage group.   
  
     Average score values of both the “10 to 20” and “20 to 30” hour usage groups are 
comparable to one another for each security technology.  A noticeable increase in average 
values takes place from the “20 to 30” range to the “30 to 40” hour range, and the 
average values again plateau to comparable values in the “40 or more” usage group.  Just 
as in the usage frequency vs. general knowledge analysis there was a slight drop in 
average scores from the “30 to 40” group to the “40 or more” grouping.  Again, while 
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this data contradicts any progressing of increased usage frequency yielding increased 
knowledge of information security tools, it is likely a distribution issue of participants 
within the “30 or more hours” demographic that require work or exposure with these 
technologies.  There still remains a clear progression of increased knowledge in 
conjunction with increased general technology usage from 10 to 40 hours.  This is a 
likely scenario in that increased usage should allow for more opportunities of exposure to 
new or different technologies; hence a greater familiarity with information security tools 
in this study.   
     While the overwhelming number of participants who have never used any of the 
SFTP, SSH, or data encryption technologies have already been discussed, there are still 
data patterns of security tool usage in relation to position categories.   Faculty participants 
appear use SFTP the 
most with 44.4% of 
faculty having used 
these technologies in 
one of the four 
intervals (daily, 
weekly, monthly, and 
annually).  Staff and 
students follow with 41.4% and 30.2% respectively.  The results for SSH tools follow 
along the same pattern with usage from faculty, staff and students at 33.3%, 24.1%, and 
18.9% respectively.  With encryption and spyware/malware tools the pattern changes.  
Staff participants appear to use data encryption technologies the most at 51.7%, followed 
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by faculty (29.6%) then students (24.5%).  A likely source of discrepancy between SFTP, 
SSH, and data encryption tools usage patterns is the requirements of the work and data of 
the participants.  The increased use of data encryption vs. use of secure connectivity tools 
among staff members may also reveal issues regarding data storage and usage associated 
with each position category.  The data would support a scenario where faculty more 
frequently access off-site or network data storage, whereas staff more frequently work 
with the data locally, requiring local data security methods such as data encryption.  
Spyware/malware scanning tools usage results are an inversion of the data encryption 
usage pattern.  Staff positions are the most infrequent users of spyware/malware scanning 
technologies at 51.7%.  Faculty have the highest percentage of users at 81.5% followed 
by 75.5% of students.  It is difficult to imagine any scenario of data usage, work 
requirements, or accessibility that would explain this usage pattern given the nature of 
spyware/malware security threats; therefore other issues (lack of education or 
understanding of spyware/malware issues) must be in effect.   
     Erratic results plague the analysis of general technology usage frequency with usage 
of information 
security tools.  While 
there is a significant 
jump in user 
participation with 
SFTP, SSH and data 
encryption by 25.7%, 
11%, and 27.6% 
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respectively, from the “20 to 30” hour per week group to the “30 to 40” group, once 
again we see a decline in SSH and data encryption tools use when technology usage 
increases beyond 40 hours a week.  The usage pattern for spyware/malware shows a drop 
in user participation with this technology within the “30 to 40” hours per week range 
while usage increased in the “20 to 30” group (71.4%) and “40+” group (80.8%).  The 
assessment of these findings is that the data correlates with the position vs. technology 
usage results due to the position make-up of the general technology usage groups.  
Results in the population assessment showed most staff fell in the “30 to 40” usage range, 
where more faculty and students aligned with the “40 or more” group.   
 
Threats:      
     In looking at how position categories differ in their knowledge of information security 
threats, it seems on average faculty scored the highest for viruses/worms, 
trojans/backdoors, and data interception.  
Students edged faculty in knowledge scores for spyware/malware threats, and only by a 
mere +0.1 points.  Staff scored the lowest of all three major categories, and within the 
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staff group itself, administrative staff scored significantly less than research staff (by an 
average of 1.2 points) for all information security threats. The separation of each position 
in threat knowledge appears relatively consistent across all threats, and on a whole, there 
is only a 0.8 point average separation from the lowest and highest recorded average 
scores across all threats. 
     With technology usage frequency and information security threat knowledge, there is 
also a consistent progression that demonstrates a linear correlation between the two 
variables (an exception exists for spyware/malware threats between the “20 to 30” and 
“30 to 40” groups – a 0.2 point drop occurs).  
      
     For all average scores, barring the lone exception, as usage frequency increases the 
user’s knowledge of information security threats is equal to or increases from the 
previous usage frequency interval.  While the increments of increasing knowledge are not 
necessarily compelling, the overall trend is certainly noteworthy.  This is in contrast with 
usage and technology knowledge trends, where a drop occurred as usage frequencies 
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went beyond 40 hours a week.  While there is speculation that either the type of work or 
the distribution of specific roles that may require less technology interaction or exposure 
was the cause of that drop in average scores, these results demonstrate that knowledge of 
information security threats and knowledge of security technologies are independent of 
one another, and also likely independent of type of work or role factors that may have 
influenced participants’ knowledge in security technologies.  The ability to assess threat 
knowledge based on usage frequencies is valuable in terms of defining the overall 
culture, defining areas for improvement, and in developing effective solutions for 
improvement with regards to security threats.  
  
     With years of experience with respect to threat knowledge, the results are similar to 
those of usage frequency and technology knowledge in that users with the most 
experience have an average score that is less than the experience interval preceding it.  
There is a consistent increase in knowledge from the “0 to 10” and “11 to 20” group 
across all threats (average of 0.3 points) that coincides with expected thinking (that 
greater experience in years allows for greater opportunities of exposure to threats, hence 
greater threat knowledge).  The drop in the highest experience group, though 
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contradicting to this train of thought, is difficult to assess due to the small percentage of 
participants that fall into this group.  While the data cannot be completely disregarded, 
any trends formulated from this data must take this into consideration. 
     Before any correlations between position, experience, and usage are made with threat 
susceptibility and infection rates, the data reveals that 29 survey participants, 26.1% of 
total participants, claimed to have ever personally experienced an information security 
threat or breach.  In terms of affected percentage with respect to position, 33.3%, 31%, 
and 26.4% of faculty, staff, and students, respectively, answered yes to ever having 
experiences an information security threat first hand.  With years of experience, 25%, 
31.7% and 33.3% of users in the “0 to 10”, “11 to 20” and “20+” ranges respectively 
were personally affected by a threat; and 20%, 28.6%, 23.3%, and 34.6% of users in the 
usage frequency groups of “10 to 20”, “20 to 30”, “30 to 40”, and “40+” respectively 
responded positive to personal threat experience as well.  The complete landscape of 
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affected users shows that there is fairly even distribution of overall threat experience 
among all variable groups addressed in this study.  While this says nothing regarding 
specific threats, it does point to the notion that information security threats as an overall 
problem evenly affects the entire population.    
     The raw data shows overwhelming evidence that spyware/malware threats are the 
most common threats experienced.  An explanation of the raw values; however, is 
necessary in that while the total number of spyware/malware incidences dwarfs the next 
incidence total (for viruses and worms listed at 83 incidences) by a factor of 46.2, it is not 
uncommon for a 
single user to 
record several 
hundred 
spyware/malware incidences due to the nature of scanning tools and the rules that 
determine what is and is not considered a spyware/malware incidence.  Common web 
browser cookies, depending on the scanner used, can be flagged as a single 
spyware/malware incidence.  Proof that this must be taken into consideration is that two 
participants alone accounted for 3000 of the 3832 total spyware/malware incidences.  
    With that stated, viruses and worms is the most common threat experienced when 
looking at percentage of affected participants.  93.1% of participants who claimed to have 
experienced an information security threat listed viruses and worms as one of the 
incidences.  Spyware/malware, Trojan/backdoor, and data interception threats followed 
with 58.6%, 44.8% and 6.9% respectively.  This provides a more accurate account of the 
threat-effectiveness on the total population, since some users are more prone to 
 35
experiencing threats and breaches, generally because of usage behavior or inferior 
technology.  Viruses and worms have the highest infection rate, 24.3%, of the total 
population, and it is not out of expectations given that the most common mode of 
transmission for viruses and worms are through infected emails and email attachments.  
Email is arguably the most frequently used information technology for all populations, 
and the sheer volume of emails being transmitted to and from this population could lend 
to the high infection rate even with a minimal percentage of infected emails in 
circulation.  The efficient and pervasive propagation methods of viruses and worm would 
also account for the higher infection rate, in comparison to the other information security 
threats discussed.  Oddly enough, while the population on a whole was more 
knowledgeable with viruses and worms than any other information security threat, it also 
had the highest incidence rate of all threats.  It is difficult to determine whether this 
higher level of knowledge is the result of threat experience, or whether the knowledge is 
based on education and general awareness.  Data interception was expected to yield the 
lowest incidence rate in that it is the most difficult to execute of the four information 
security threats. 
     In looking at incidence rates among the position categories, again the results can be 
deceiving if taken at face value.  With respect to viruses and worms, students recorded 
the highest incidence count (45) followed by faculty and staff at 22 and 16 respectively.  
If the population percentage for each group is factored in, it is expected that students 
make up twice as many incidences as faculty given the students account for twice as 
many participants as faculty.  Both faculty and staff are of roughly equal in population 
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percentage, so these results show that staff participants have a lower incidence rate than 
faculty participants.  
 A closer look at the data; however, shows that two student participants accounted for 30 
of the 45 virus/worm threat incidences, and three faculty participants accounted for 15 of 
the 22 incidences recorded.  The position vs. number of participants who reported 
virus/worm threat incidences shows a much more balanced distribution with 9, 8, and 10 
participants for faculty, staff and students respectively.   
     For the remaining threats; however, this balance is present.  With both 
Trojans/backdoors and spyware/malware threats, we see separation that may actually be 
the result of population percentages for each position.  Students, by far, has the most 
participants recording incidences at 8 and 10 for Trojans/backdoors and spyware/malware 
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threats respectively.  Faculty recorded only 2 and 4 participants respectively, and staff 
had 3 and 3 respectively.  The fairly even values for faculty and staff with the large 
increase in students can easily be the result of population percentages, even though the 
values do not correspond 1:1 with the population percentages.  The data interception 
threat is difficult to gauge or associate with a trend because only two total incidences (by 
two separate participants; one faculty, one student) were recorded.  While data 
interception is a very real threat, the number of incidences reported could show that with 
respect to this population it is not a significant issue that needs to be addressed.  This 
could be due to the technology infrastructure in the work environment that reduces the 
threat of data interception, or simply the difficulty of executing such a threat.  
Unfortunately, the data does not refute the idea that data interception incidences are 
higher than recorded but that the participants are unaware of the occurrence. 
      The impact of usage frequency on threat incidences does not support any linear 
correlation between the two; however, it is evident that the most incidences reported 
occur among users in the “40+” hours-per-week group.  64.1% of all non-
spyware/malware incidences occurred in this group. The next highest incidence rate for 
 38
non-spyware/malware threat incidences occurs in the “20 to 30” usage frequency group at 
23.1% followed by users in the “30 to 40” group with 12.8%.  While the order of 
incidence rates based on usage frequency groups for spyware/malware threats or identical 
to those of non-spyware/malware threats, the percentages are slightly different.  Because 
of the unequal distribution, and magnitude of inequality, of spyware/malware threats 
among those affected, this percentage data is not as useful in this analysis.  There is no 
firm reasoning to explain the drop in incidence rates of the “30 to 40” hour group.  While 
it is easy to claim a simple distribution abnormality of the participants in the results, this 
group contains the second most number of participants in usage frequency breakdown at 
27.5% of the total population.  Significance is not lost, however, in this comparison with 
the highest usage frequency group recording the highest incidence rates.  The 
overwhelming margin of separation must support some correlation between usage 
frequency and information security threat incidence.   
     Although usage frequency and years of experience are not one and the same, the data 
of experience vs. threat 
incidence somewhat 
coincides with the implied 
correlation that an increase 
in usage (in terms of years 
for this comparison) yields 
an increase in threat 
susceptibility and 
experience.  There is a 59% increase in incidence rate from 15.4% to 74.4% as years of 
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experience go from “0 to 10” to “11 to 20” for non-spyware/malware threats.  With 
spyware/malware threats included, the incidence rate increase by 66.4% (however this 
data is skewed just discussed previously).  The “21+” years group does not support this 
trend by dropping to a 10.3% and 0.3% incidence rate for non-spyware/malware threats 
and with spyware/malware threats, respectively.  In this case, however, simple user 
distribution abnormalities can be claimed in this analysis because the “21+” group 
accounts for only 8.3% of the total population.  Users in the “0 to 10” and “11 to 20” 
groups account for 36.7% and 55% of the population respectively.   
     Another component to understanding information security threats in this context is the 
process of threat contraction.  Six common areas of vulnerability for information security 
threats were used to determine the most common way users are infected or breached.  
Overall findings show that surfing the internet/web was the most common medium for 
threat contraction at 18 instances, 32.1% of all recorded instances (Note that instances do 
not correlate 1:1 to threat incidences earlier discussed; methods for threat contraction 
 40
were not requested for each incidence, but rather as a possible reason for the cause of 
overall threat experience).  Opening an infected file/email is the second leading cause of 
threat experience at 23.2%, and web links, network attacks, software installations, and 
physical intrusions followed with 10.7%, 8.9%, 8.9%, and 5.4% respectively.  “Other” 
ways of infection/breach made up 10.7% of all recorded reasons and mostly included 
“unidentifiable” or “unknown” as the reason. 
     
 
Policy: 
 
     The policy section of the survey was designed to gauge general policy knowledge at 
both the departmental and campus-wide level, as well as HIPAA awareness.  An overall 
analysis shows that 90.8% of all participants were most familiar with HIPAA policy.  
Departmental policies and campus policies followed with 33% and 22.9% respectively.  
This breakdown coincides with the 
expected degrees of familiarity with 
each policy group.  As a population 
in a department that focuses on 
public health research, all users 
should be fully aware of HIPAA 
policy as it applies directly or 
indirectly to their work.  It would also be reasonable to expect users to understand the 
policies of the department they work directly under more so than any larger-
encompassing organization.  It is surprising however the discrepancies in percentages 
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between HIPAA policy and other policies that affect the population.  It shows that other 
than HIPAA, the policy-awareness of participants is fairly low. 
    In looking at how positions differ in their policy awareness, the data shows that policy 
awareness is fairly evenly distributed across all groups based on their population 
percentage.  With students accounting for roughly twice as many participants as both 
faculty and staff, and the data represents this ratio with 49 to 25 to 25 positive HIPAA 
policy responses respectively.  With departmental policy, staff participants have a higher 
score than faculty, 11 to 8 
positive responses 
respectively; however the 
inverse is the case with 
campus policy with faculty 
recording 8 positive 
responses to 5 for the staff 
participants.  Though the raw values for research staff are higher than administrative 
staff, it is important to factor in that the research staff out weight administrative staff by a 
count of 21 to 8.  With this factored in, however, this only moderately accounts for the 20 
to 5 positive responses for research to administrative staff in positive HIPAA policy 
responses.  The larger discrepancy is most likely the result of the type of work required 
for each group.  It is conceivable that researchers would encounter HIPAA policy 
regulations in a more direct manner by working with the actual research data.   
     In looking at how years of experience affect departmental, campus, and HIPAA policy 
awareness, one would expect that more years of experience would produce a higher 
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awareness rate due to the longer exposure time to information security issues. The raw 
number data supports this notion firmly in regards to departmental and HIPAA policy.  
With campus policy, there is minimal increase (by 1 user) in policy awareness with 
increased experience.  In looking at percentages, however, there is little difference 
between policy 
awareness with users 
in the “0 to 10” and 
“11 to 20” years of 
experience ranges 
(just as demonstrated 
in technology and threat results, it is difficult to place value on results of the “21+” due to 
the low population percentage of this group).  This further analysis shows there really is 
no distinction between users with more experience.  In fact, a lower percentage of users 
with “11 to 20” years of experience were less familiar with campus policies than users 
with “0 to 10” years of experience.  The lower experience group also edged the “11 to 
20” group in HIPAA awareness, but only by 0.8%.  The only policy where more 
experience seems to yield greater policy awareness is with departmental policies, with a 
+5.0% difference between the “0 to 10”and “11 to 20” ranges. 
     Usage frequencies and policy awareness follows the same pattern as experience where 
raw values do not truly demonstrate the distribution properly.  Raw values may increase 
linearly with an increase in usage frequency, but in actuality, awareness percentages 
decrease with departmental and campus policies. With departmental policies, awareness 
percentages drop from 60% to 38.1% to 36.7% to 26.9% for groups “10 to 20”, “20 to 
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30”, “30 to 40” and “40+” respectively.  With campus policies, there is an 18.1% increase 
from “10 to 20” to “20 to30”, but percentages decrease by 7.9% in the next group, then 
decrease by a surprising 
16.5% with the last 
grouping where only 
13.64% of “40+” users 
are aware of campus 
policies.  No awareness 
percentages for any 
group drop below 80.95% with respect to the HIPAA policy, and 92.8% of users who use 
information technologies for 30 or more hours a week are aware of the HIPAA policy.  
The glaring statistic in this comparison is clearly the drop in awareness percentages with 
increased usage frequency for departmental and campus policies.  It is possible that the 
large population percentage of this group (47.7%) may be working against the expected 
“increase in usage yields increase in awareness” trend, but the drop in awareness 
percentages is too significant to 
ignore.  
     In addition to policy 
awareness, the population was 
asked to rate their level of 
concern regarding the 
effectiveness of information 
security policy and also the 
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importance of an 
information security policy 
in relation to their work in 
the department.  With 
respect to the concern of 
effectiveness, the entire 
population rates their 
concern above average for 
information security policy effectiveness.  In looking at score averages among positions, 
all position categories scored 6.3, 6.9, and 6 for faculty, staff and students respectively.  
With regards to usage, there were some erratic values in users with 0 to 20 hours per 
week of information technology usage with a score of 9 for the “0 to 10” group and 5.2 
for users in the “10 to 20” range.  The scores level off for users posting 20 or more hours 
of usage with an average score of 6.3 for all users in that range.  The extreme scores of 
the lower usage levels is most likely a factor of population distribution and percentage.  
With respect to years of experience and concern of effectiveness, there was a slight drop 
in concern scores, 6.6 to 5.9, 
from group “0 to 10” to “11 to 
20”. The “21+” experience 
group had the highest score 
with 7.6, but it’s difficult to 
gauge the impact of this score 
given the small population 
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percentage.  With regards to the drop in concern scores from “0 to10” and “11 to 20”, this 
could mean that the mentality of more experienced user is one of less fear of information 
security issues or that policy is not as important in addressing information security issues. 
     When asked whether an 
information security policy is 
important to the participant’s work, 
overall population scores average 
at 6.9 points (on a 10 point scale).  
With respect to position, both 
faculty and staff average scores 
were higher than the total population average at 7 and 7.7 respectively.  Students seemed 
less concerned on the importance of an information security policy with an average score 
of 6.4.  One notable statistic is that research staff had the highest average scores, 8.1, with 
this question.  This was expected based on their direct work with research data, which 
can include patient-identifiable data or other private data.  
    There seems to be little 
difference in the scores of all 
users with anywhere from 0 to 
20 years of experience with an 
average score of 6.75.  Users 
with 21+ years of experience 
scored a much higher 8.6 
points on the scale of importance.  Since this group only represents 9 out of 109 total 
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participants, it’s difficult to associate any trend, particularly with the almost equal score 
representations for both the “0 to 10” and “11 to 20” experience ranges.  This is most 
likely a result of user distribution rather than any insightful result; however the almost 
two-point increase would warrant further research to determine that a simple distribution 
trend is the explanation.   
     In looking at usage frequency, there appears to be a linear increase in average scores 
from the “10 to 20” range all the way through to the “20 to 30” hours per week range.  
Though the “0 to 10” range has a higher score than “10 to 20”, the “0 to 10” range only 
represents one participant and shouldn’t be factored into any trend in averages.  Going 
into the range of usage frequency 
beyond 40 hours a week, the average 
scores on the scale of information 
security policy importance drops 0.5 
points to 6.8.  A steady increase, as 
noted between 10 to 40 hours of 
usage, is an expected trend in that 
with increased hours of usage there is a greater possibility of having to work with data or 
processes that require higher information security needs.  Greater security needs would 
lend to an increased awareness to the importance of an information security policy.  The 
drop in the highest usage frequency group is evidence that further research into the exact 
work of each participant is needed to fully understand usage trends in information 
security policy awareness and importance. 
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Final Words    
Conclusion: 
     The goal of this study is to assess the general awareness and culture of information 
security within an academic department (specifically the Department of Epidemiology at 
UNC-CH) and the survey questions used provided enough data to shape an overall 
landscape of information security.  The analysis of the scores in the previous section 
show an overall trend of low confidence and understanding of information security 
issues.  With general awareness, a majority of the population ranked below average in 
knowledge and understanding of general information security issues.  In this section, no 
specific issues were discussed with the purpose of maintaining an overall outlook of 
general awareness and to avoid slight advantages for users with knowledge of specific 
issues as a result of their work or opportunities. While the scales used for most of this 
survey do not truly provide a quantitative understanding of these issues, it is clear that 
this department does not have a firm or clear understanding of information security issues 
as an overall level of awareness.   
     Low knowledge scores to most of the technologies and threats discussed also support 
this outlook.  The overall data in both of these sections show that users are 
knowledgeable of technologies and threats based on their direct interaction or level of 
usages.  Technologies and threats with low usage frequencies or incidence rates scored 
low in knowledge and understanding.  The culture of this population is that unless it 
affects a user closely, they are generally unaware of information security technologies 
and threats that may one day affect them.  Policy behavior is much the same.   
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     This is somewhat disheartening to see in that these technologies chosen for this study 
represent the technologies that provide a basic level of information security when used.  
While users showed a promising level of concern about spyware/malware issues and 
reinforced this with the high level of participation with spyware/malware scanning tools, 
these issues are only a small part of information security issues that affect users on a daily 
basis.  In this study, users exhibited acceptable levels of knowledge and use with only 
25% of the security technologies mentioned.  This is a low percentage given the nature of 
these technologies.   
     With threats, the low general knowledge is one concern considering almost 1/3 of all 
participants have been affected by information security threats on a personal level.  With 
nearly all of these affected users having had experiences with viruses and worms, it is 
surprising the knowledge of this particular threat is not significantly higher than the other 
threats.  While with this survey it is difficult to tell whether what specific aspects of 
threat knowledge the users are lacking in, the results show that this population has below 
average awareness of common information security threats.  With such large and 
accessible network resources, low threat knowledge is of even greater importance as a 
concern that needs to be addressed.  The nature of information security threats is not to 
only affect individual users, but often threat payloads spread quickly and can affect large 
numbers of users. 
     While it is reassuring that such a large portion of the population is familiar with the 
HIPAA policy, especially considering how much of a direct impact this policy can have 
in the field of epidemiology, the noticeable drop for departmental and campus policies 
again reinforces the speculated culture of “if it doesn’t affect my daily work, then I am 
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not concerned or do not need to be concerned with it”.  Unfortunately, departmental 
policies can very much affect the daily work of all users, and campus policies can 
sometimes affect users more so than departmental policies.  Most users probably assume 
that they are generally in compliance and likely think that only extreme violations will 
result in any consequences.  This lackadaisical approach to understanding the information 
security policies that are binding for users would certainly account for the low awareness 
percentage of departmental and campus policies. 
    The culture and general awareness levels in the department of epidemiology should be 
of great concern regarding information security issues.  Most of the department is in the 
dark about the very issues that can have real and significant impacts on their daily work.  
Not having any directly daily contact is no excuse for low levels of knowledge on these 
issues; however, if the department does not have any means for educating its users in 
place, then that is where efforts should be made for increasing information security 
awareness.  This department clearly needs to understand the gravity of information 
security issues, regardless of whether it currently affects their daily work, and understand 
global issues, particularly with policies, and how they do in-fact create boundaries and 
protect its users in the academic environment.  Developing programs that introduce new 
security technologies would certainly benefit this population, not only in exposure to new 
technologies, but also in generating a culture that supports change and taking advantage 
of new technologies, particularly those related information security.  Educating users on 
the possible threats they may face is important, but more important is reaching out to the 
users with knowledge on prevention and post-infection methods.  This would coincide 
with technology education and support overall awareness increase.  Implementing new 
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policy awareness can be done through offering simple educational programs/seminars for 
general policies that affect all users.  Through education, a heightened sense of awareness 
can be created, and hopefully through this awareness the department can begin generating 
a culture that will sustain a desirable long-term information security management 
program.  With the department of epidemiology, it begins knowledge. 
               
Recommendations: 
     Outside of general education programs, with possibly some tailored to specific users 
groups or user demographics as discussed in this study, it is difficult to truly identify 
specific points of attack with the data from this study.  While it does give provide a sound 
general analysis, the study provides many avenues for exploration and research to gain 
specific knowledge usable for the recommended educational programs.  One particular 
aspect of the data that was lacking in this study is the type of work users perform in their 
departmental roles.  With a better understanding of the type of work users perform, one 
can better understand the trends exhibited between the user groups used in this study.  
Some statistics did not follow expected trends, and a closer look at work type and 
requirements would help confirm or deny these abnormal patterns.  With respect to tools, 
the survey lacked specific usability details of each tool which may have contributed to the 
data patterns observed.  Overall, more detailed questions would greatly help in fully 
understanding these results.  In addition to detail, it is important that the questions are 
worded so the users are fully aware of the issues they are facing.  Some of the  users have 
posed this issue following the data collection and this would certainly be an area for 
improvement with following research. 
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